Kali’s Child: Or, Do I Really Have to Read This?

February 9th, 2010

It’s not on my bibliography and it’s not important to my studies, but tonight I started flipping through Jeffrey Kripal’s Kali’s Child:  The Mystical and the Erotic in the Life and Teachings of Ramakrishna.  It’s a notorious book and I’d like to read it, though it’s a bit lengthy (300+ pages) at a moment when time/stamina to read serious scholarship are at a premium.

I was loaned the book by a fellow graduate student who confidently asserts I will scandalized.  (Thesis of the book:  the most celebrated Neo-Vedanta guru, Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, was a celibate homosexual and his mystical experiences of the goddess Kali are expressions of sublimated homosexual eros).  I can’t for the life of me see how that is going to surprise or scandalize me.  The relationship between sublimated eros and mysticism is one I think about a great deal for both personal and professional reasons, and the arc between Platonic love (same-sex love “spiritualized” for the philosophical and mystical betterment of both parties) to medieval courtly love (passionate but non-physical love for any human being other than one’s spouse) to robust Marian devotion seems historically and psychologically obvious.  Cross-cultural comparison can of course be challenging, but I think there’s enough material in Indian bhakti literature to establish the same kind of psycho-social stereotyping.  In both India and Europe, sublimated eros appears to be the major driving factor in mystical love, and this is recognized by some theorists (e.g. Vallabhacarya) well enough to have become a major interpretative principle - the love of the gopis for Krishna is theorized to be as intense as it is precisely because they are not married to Krishna and the relationship is scandalous and illegitimate.  If there could be morally-unproblematic,  conventional heterosexual liaisons between Krishna and the gopis, the story goes, the passion would be less and the relationship could not serve as a model for deep mystical experience.  This isn’t to say that something pure (mysticism) is sullied by something dirty (sex) or that the sublimated erotic doesn’t lead sacramentally beyond itself into something more spiritual - only, there is a real connection here.  So:  Ramakrishna a homosexual?  Why not?  Scandalous:  hardly.  It’s so non-scandalous and non-surprising that it’s taking a great deal of effort to convince myself it’s worth 300 pages worth of my time to establish the obvious.

What’s the Harm in Dating?

February 9th, 2010

Ex-student for several years now, graduated so no longer any possibility of being a student, bright, older than I am, interested in philosophy/religion, previously married (now divorced), not Catholic, prob. not Christian - might be in love with me, hit-me-over-the-head-with-a-two-by-four obvious with the flirting, which is more-or-less what it takes to get me to notice.  (I assume people don’t offer to create a FB fan page so they can be your personal groupie with purely Platonic feelings - though you never know).

Is there a moral dilemma here?

PS: I’ve never been on a date.

Yr Conflicted Augustinian Friend,

+Wulfila

Of Stones and Scorpions: Or, Beware the Substitute Preacher

February 7th, 2010

Real life homily from tonight’s mass:

There is absolutely nothing that can happen to you which you do not in fact deserve, so no complaint of injustice against God or other people is ever under any circumstances justified, period, no exceptions.  There is no happiness in life, so relish in your suffering - because that’s all you’re going to get, ever.  It’s God’s will and you have no right to question it.

A friend’s satire:

If a child asks for bread, and his father gives him a stone, he should assume he deserved it, and think twice about asking for fish!

On Magisterium

February 6th, 2010

When I was a decade younger and even more of an idealistic fool than I am today (that is, 22 or 23 years old) I organized a joint academic conference and campus ministries event at the University of Chicago on sacred hermeneutics in the secular academy.

One of the invited speakers at that event (a rather conservative Catholic theologian, as it happens)  scandalized me by professing his sympathy for theologians who find themselves  sometimes unable to accept a particular authoritative teaching for reason of conscience, thereby keeping to their own judgments rather than reading texts with the grain of their church’s magisterium.  It seemed to me that once you admitted independence of conscience as a hermeneutical principle, you were a great deal down the road to actual dissent, so I registered my protest.

I had not been to Anglican seminary nor unjustly accused of heresy, so my idea of magisterium was a rather optimistic estimation of what the magisterium of the Episcopal Church could possibly do to someone (that is, I thought, absolutely nothing but whatever happens to be just and right).  I had not become Roman Catholic and learned about another, rather more forcible magisterium.  I had not observed theologians other than myself make statements within the established bonds of orthodoxy only for whether they would be treated as a heretic or an orthodox exponent of the tradition to be decided politically and adventitiously, with different bishops coming to (and enforcing) radically different conclusions.  In other words, I was a naive fool and my interlocutor was entirely correct - as I suppose one might have expected.

I have long wondered whatever happened to this wise individual.  I haven’t been able to keep in touch.  I wonder what has changed.   It is possible that he died.  I love him and I miss him and would like for him to drop me a line.  He’s the guy who made it possible for me to become Catholic, and I cannot be Catholic without him.

Si Autem Sciretis Quid Est Misericordiam Volo et Non Sacrificium, Numquam Condemnassetis Innocentes

February 6th, 2010

quid autem vobis videtur homo habebat duos filios et accedens ad primum dixit fili vade hodie operare in vinea mea

ille autem respondens ait nolo postea autem paenitentia motus abiit

accedens autem ad alterum dixit similiter at ille respondens ait eo domine et non ivit

quis ex duobus fecit voluntatem patris?

dicunt novissimus

dicit illis Iesus amen dico vobis quia publicani et meretrices praecedunt vos in regno Dei.

The second son had obedience but no love for his father, so he ended up with neither.  The first son had no obedience but loved his father, so he ended up with both.  The outwardly obedient (the righteous) enter heaven after the publicly and contumaciously disobedient (prostitutes and tax collectors) - eorum qui habet aures, audiat.

Love and Obedience: An Exercise in Imagination

February 5th, 2010

Probity, sincerity, candor, conviction, the sense of duty, are things which may become hideous when wrongly directed; but which, even when hideous, remain grand: their majesty, the majesty peculiar to the human conscience, clings to them in the midst of horror; they are virtues which have one vice - error. The honest, pitiless joy of a fanatic in the full flood of his atrocity preserves a certain lugubriously venerable radiance. Without himself suspecting the fact, Javert in his formidable happiness was to be pitied, as is every ignorant man who triumphs. Nothing could be so poignant and so terrible as this face, wherein was displayed all that may be designated as the evil of the good (Victor Hugo on Javert in Les Miserables Vol 1, Book VIII, Chapter 3).

A thought-experiment:

Imagine that obedience were a genuine moral good which, because of the fall, has become unattainable for human beings who pursue it.  No matter how good you are and how hard you try, you necessarily fail in your efforts to be perfectly obedient - and because obedience cannot be selective (partial obedience is no obedience at all), that means everyone is equally (that is, totally) disobedient.

Given this sorry state of affairs, some people will make an effort to be obedient and some people will not, but the result will be qualitatively (if not necessarily quantitatively) the same - a population consisting of persons more-or-less equal in their degree of disobedience (relative differences that seem great to us mattering for almost nothing sub specie aeternitatis), who are held absolutely disobedient for reason of failure to maintain the perfect obedience required.

Crucially now:  imagine that human instincts are so constituted that the effort to maintain obedience serves only to deepen disobedience.  Why might this be so, and equally so for the relatively obedient as for the relatively disobedient?

The relatively disobedient will either despair of any possibility of obedience and corrupt their natural moral instincts (which may after all be motivated by factors other than desire for obedience), or else convince themselves they possess a degree of obedience they do not in fact possess which encourages them to condemn other people less virtuous than themselves.

Either group of the disobedient would be better off without introducing the idea of obedience - the first would not give themselves up to despair over their manifest disobedience and would probably behave better for never having tried to be obedient in the first place, and the second would not further vitiate their already imperfect obedience by judging other people so harshly.  (If you doubt this phenomenon in fact obtains, get out a notebook and log the number of times per week you will commit a habitual sin if you are convinced your standing before God depends upon it and you must not commit this sin, versus the number of times you will commit the same sin if you leave yourself to your own natural, untutored thoughts and inclinations).

Let’s imagine the worst-case scenario:  someone achieves substantial (though definitionally-imperfect) obedience, enough to fool them into thinking they are in fact obedient and that obedience is a helpful and necessary moral disposition.  Because they’ve managed to restrain some of their most destructive impulses by subordinating themselves to an external moral standard, they’ve become convinced that without obedience to such a standard, the alternative is unfettered libido dominandi (the sinful and destructive desire to dominate others) and the law of tooth and fang, so they need to commend obedience and condemn disobedience whenever they see it, as if the world itself were at stake.  The result will obviously and necessarily be a dramatic increase in libido dominandi justified as the effort to extirpate libido dominandi - resulting if not in hypocrisy (insisting that other people must meet a standard one cannot possibly meet), then in pride (a degree of virtue warped into vengeance and cruelty).  And pride is the apotheosis of disobedience - and the more perfect the virtue underlying the sense of pride, the deeper the pride.

(Perhaps on this account Satan perfectly keeps the moral law and desires to torment sinners in hell eternally precisely because of his zeal for the law.  Other than this capital vice of righteous zeal, let us imagine Satan may have no vices at all; his sin is pride, the righteous desire to punish sinners God wishes to forgive in order that the world will not fall apart at the seams).

If this were the case, pursuing obedience would have no moral value for human beings, and definite disvalue.  To avoid its disvalue, obedience would have to be pursued not through one’s own efforts, but received as a gift to which no one had any justifiable claim - the unmerited reception of which would naturally decrease violence and competition between people attempting to outdo one another in righteousness, increasing overall peacefulness and love.   Obedience would be an afterthought - something which is gotten (when to any degree it is gotten) only by forgetting about it and not pursuing it, by trying to give back one’s limited store of love to the God who loved you first.  To the degree that obedience is conceptualized and sought after, it is lost.

The last part of this thought-experiment:

1.  Go through the NT and tally up the number of times this interpretation of the Gospel seems to work versus the number of times it does not work.  What would this approach explain or fail to explain?

2.  If it is a better explanation than its alternatives, what pastoral benefit is to be obtained by recommending obedience as a Christian virtue?

Margins of Theology: Inculturation

February 3rd, 2010

For Arturo Vasquez:

Na hi svabhavo bhavanam pratyayadishu vidyate | avidyamane svabhave parabhavo na vidyate. For own-being of entities is not found in such things as conditions;  own-being not being found, other-being is not found (Nagarjuna, Mulamadhyamakakarika I.3).

The fruits are ripe, dipped in fire,
Cooked and sampled on earth.  And there’s a law,
That things crawl off in the manner of snakes,
Prophetically, dreaming on the hills of heaven.
And there is much that needs to be retained,
Like a load of wood on the shoulders.
But the pathways are dangerous.
The captured elements and ancient laws of earth
Run astray like horses.  There is a constant yearning
For all that is unconfined.  But much needs
To be retained.  And loyalty is required.
Yet we mustn’t look forwards or backwards.
We should let ourselves be cradled
As if on a boat rocking on a lake
(Hölderlin, Mnemosyne).

And ideas behave like rumours,
once casually mentioned somewhere
they come back to the door as prodigies
born to prodigal fathers, with eyes
that vaguely look like our own,
like what Uncle said the other day
that every Plotinus we read
is what some Alexander looted
between the malarial rivers
(A.K. Ramanujan, “Small Scale Reflections on a Great House”)
.

You cannot step twice into the same river; for other waters are continually flowing in (Heraclitus, DK22b91).

But there are also many other things which Jesus did; were every one of them to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written (John 21.25).

Placebo vs. Antidepressants: More Evidence

January 30th, 2010

Taken by itself, I don’t think this would amount to an argument against antidepressants so much as an argument for the placebo effect in whatever culturally-appropriate form in which you’re able to get it.  (Bring on the curanderos!)  But there are issues which complicate this more neutral picture, such as the moral implications of marketing a disease and therefore stoking up the perceived need for a particular kind of treatment then making a lot of money on placebos - and of course the unique cultural prestige (even normativity) accorded the psychiatric industry and its interpretation of mental phenomena, which displace indigenous constructions of illness and their typically more effective treatments.

From Newsweek:

The Depressing News About Antidepressants

Studies suggest that the popular drugs are no more effective than a placebo. In fact, they may be worse.

By Sharon Begley | NEWSWEEK
Published Jan 29, 2010

Although the year is young, it has already brought my first moral dilemma. In early January a friend mentioned that his New Year’s resolution was to beat his chronic depression once and for all. Over the years he had tried a medicine chest’s worth of antidepressants, but none had really helped in any enduring way, and when the side effects became so unpleasant that he stopped taking them, the withdrawal symptoms (cramps, dizziness, headaches) were torture. Did I know of any research that might help him decide whether a new antidepressant his doctor recommended might finally lift his chronic darkness at noon?

The moral dilemma was this: oh, yes, I knew of 20-plus years of research on antidepressants, from the old tricyclics to the newer selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) that target serotonin (Zoloft, Paxil, and the granddaddy of them all, Prozac, as well as their generic descendants) to even newer ones that also target norepinephrine (Effexor, Wellbutrin). The research had shown that antidepressants help about three quarters of people with depression who take them, a consistent finding that serves as the basis for the oft-repeated mantra “There is no question that the safety and efficacy of antidepressants rest on solid scientific evidence,” as psychiatry professor Richard Friedman of Weill Cornell Medical College recently wrote in The New York Times. But ever since a seminal study in 1998, whose findings were reinforced by landmark research in The Journal of the American Medical Association last month, that evidence has come with a big asterisk. Yes, the drugs are effective, in that they lift depression in most patients. But that benefit is hardly more than what patients get when they, unknowingly and as part of a study, take a dummy pill—a placebo. As more and more scientists who study depression and the drugs that treat it are concluding, that suggests that antidepressants are basically expensive Tic Tacs.

Hence the moral dilemma. The placebo effect—that is, a medical benefit you get from an inert pill or other sham treatment—rests on the holy trinity of belief, expectation, and hope. But telling someone with depression who is being helped by antidepressants, or who (like my friend) hopes to be helped, threatens to topple the whole house of cards. Explain that it’s all in their heads, that the reason they’re benefiting is the same reason why Disney’s Dumbo could initially fly only with a feather clutched in his teeth—believing makes it so—and the magic dissipates like fairy dust in a windstorm. So rather than tell my friend all this, I chickened out. Sure, I said, there’s lots of research showing that a new kind of antidepressant might help you. Come, let me show you the studies on PubMed.

It seems I am not alone in having moral qualms about blowing the whistle on antidepressants. That first analysis, in 1998, examined 38 manufacturer-sponsored studies involving just over 3,000 depressed patients. The authors, psychology researchers Irving Kirsch and Guy Sapirstein of the University of Connecticut, saw—as everyone else had—that patients did improve, often substantially, on SSRIs, tricyclics, and even MAO inhibitors, a class of antidepressants that dates from the 1950s. This improvement, demonstrated in scores of clinical trials, is the basis for the ubiquitous claim that antidepressants work. But when Kirsch compared the improvement in patients taking the drugs with the improvement in those taking dummy pills—clinical trials typically compare an experimental drug with a placebo—he saw that the difference was minuscule. Patients on a placebo improved about 75 percent as much as those on drugs. Put another way, three quarters of the benefit from antidepressants seems to be a placebo effect. “We wondered, what’s going on?” recalls Kirsch, who is now at the University of Hull in England. “These are supposed to be wonder drugs and have huge effects.”

The study’s impact? The number of Americans taking antidepressants doubled in a decade, from 13.3 million in 1996 to 27 million in 2005.

To be sure, the drugs have helped tens of millions of people, and Kirsch certainly does not advocate that patients suffering from depression stop taking the drugs. On the contrary. But they are not necessarily the best first choice. Psychotherapy, for instance, works for moderate, severe, and even very severe depression. And although for some patients, psychotherapy in combination with an initial course of prescription antidepressants works even better, the question is, how do the drugs work? Kirsch’s study and, now, others conclude that the lion’s share of the drugs’ effect comes from the fact that patients expect to be helped by them, and not from any direct chemical action on the brain, especially for anything short of very severe depression.

As the inexorable rise in the use of antidepressants suggests, that conclusion can’t hold a candle to the simplistic “antidepressants work!” (unstated corollary: “but don’t ask how”) message. Part of the resistance to Kirsch’s findings has been due to his less-than-retiring nature. He didn’t win many friends with the cheeky title of the paper, “Listening to Prozac but Hearing Placebo.” Nor did it inspire confidence that the editors of the journal Prevention & Treatment ran a warning with his paper, saying it used meta-analysis “controversially.” Al-though some of the six invited commentaries agreed with Kirsch, others were scathing, accusing him of bias and saying the studies he analyzed were flawed (an odd charge for defenders of antidepressants, since the studies were the basis for the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of the drugs). One criticism, however, could not be refuted: Kirsch had analyzed only some studies of antidepressants. Maybe if he included them all, the drugs would emerge head and shoulders superior to placebos.

Kirsch agreed. Out of the blue, he received a letter from Thomas Moore, who was then a health-policy analyst at George Washington University. You could expand your data set, Moore wrote, by including everything drug companies sent to the FDA—published studies, like those analyzed in “Hearing Placebo,” but also unpublished studies. In 1998 Moore used the Freedom of Information Act to pry such data from the FDA. The total came to 47 company-sponsored studies—on Prozac, Paxil, Zoloft, Effexor, Serzone, and Celexa—that Kirsch and colleagues then pored over. (As an aside, it turned out that about 40 percent of the clinical trials had never been published. That is significantly higher than for other classes of drugs, says Lisa Bero of the University of California, San Francisco; overall, 22 percent of clinical trials of drugs are not published. “By and large,” says Kirsch, “the unpublished studies were those that had failed to show a significant benefit from taking the actual drug.”) In just over half of the published and unpublished studies, he and colleagues reported in 2002, the drug alleviated depression no better than a placebo. “And the extra benefit of antidepressants was even less than we saw when we analyzed only published studies,” Kirsch recalls. About 82 percent of the response to antidepressants—not the 75 percent he had calculated from examining only published studies—had also been achieved by a dummy pill.

The extra effect of real drugs wasn’t much to celebrate, either. It amounted to 1.8 points on the 54-point scale doctors use to gauge the severity of depression, through questions about mood, sleep habits, and the like. Sleeping better counts as six points. Being less fidgety during the assessment is worth two points. In other words, the clinical significance of the 1.8 extra points from real drugs was underwhelming. Now Kirsch was certain. “The belief that antidepressants can cure depression chemically is simply wrong,” he told me in January on the eve of the publication of his book The Emperor’s New Drugs: Exploding the Anti-depressant Myth.

The 2002 study ignited a furious debate, but more and more scientists were becoming convinced that Kirsch—who had won respect for research on the placebo response and who had published scores of scientific papers—was on to something. One team of researchers wondered if antidepressants were “a triumph of marketing over science.” Even defenders of antidepressants agreed that the drugs have “relatively small” effects. “Many have long been unimpressed by the magnitude of the differences observed between treatments and controls,” psychology researcher Steven Hollon of Vanderbilt University and colleagues wrote—”what some of our colleagues refer to as ‘the dirty little secret.’ ” In Britain, the agency that assesses which treatments are effective enough for the government to pay for stopped recommending antidepressants as a first-line treatment, especially for mild or moderate depression.

But if experts know that antidepressants are hardly better than placebos, few patients or doctors do. Some doctors have changed their prescribing habits, says Kirsch, but more “reacted with anger and incredulity.” Understandably. For one thing, depression is a devastating, underdiagnosed, and undertreated disease. Of course doctors recoiled at the idea that such drugs might be mirages. If that were true, how were physicians supposed to help their patients?

Two other factors are at work in the widespread rejection of Kirsch’s (and, now, other scientists’) findings about antidepressants. First, defenders of the drugs scoff at the idea that the FDA would have approved ineffective drugs. (Simple explanation: the FDA requires two well-designed clinical trials showing a drug is more effective than a placebo. That’s two, period—even if many more studies show no such effectiveness. And the size of the “more effective” doesn’t much matter, as long as it is statistically significant.) Second, doctors see with their own eyes, and feel with their hearts, that the drugs lift the black cloud from many of their depressed patients. But since doctors are not exactly in the habit of prescribing dummy pills, they have no experience comparing how their patients do on them, and therefore never see that a placebo would be almost as effective as a $4 pill. “When they prescribe a treatment and it works,” says Kirsch, “their natural tendency is to attribute the cure to the treatment.” Hence the widespread “antidepressants work” refrain that persists to this day.

Drug companies do not dispute Kirsch’s aggregate statistics. But they point out that the average is made up of some patients in whom there is a true drug effect of antidepressants and some in whom there is not. As a spokesperson for Lilly (maker of Prozac) said, “Depression is a highly individualized illness,” and “not all patients respond the same way to a particular treatment.” In addition, notes a spokesperson for Glaxo-Smith-Kline (maker of Paxil), the studies analyzed in the JAMA paper differ from studies GSK submitted to the FDA when it won approval for Paxil, “so it is difficult to make direct comparisons between the results. This study contributes to the extensive research that has helped to characterize the role of antidepressants,” which “are an important option, in addition to counseling and lifestyle changes, for treatment of depression.” A spokesperson for Pfizer, which makes Zoloft, also cited the “wealth of scientific evidence documenting [antidepressants'] effects,” adding that the fact that antidepressants “commonly fail to separate from placebo” is “a fact well known by the FDA, academia, and industry.” Other manufacturers pointed out that Kirsch and the JAMA authors had not studied their particular brands.

Even Kirsch’s analysis, however, found that antidepressants are a little more effective than dummy pills—those 1.8 points on the depression scale. Maybe Prozac, Zoloft, Paxil, Celexa, and their cousins do have some non-placebo, chemical benefit. But the small edge of real drugs compared with placebos might not mean what it seems, Kirsch explained to me one evening from his home in Hull. Consider how research on drugs works. Patient volunteers are told they will receive either the drug or a placebo, and that neither they nor the scientists will know who is getting what. Most volunteers hope they get the drug, not the dummy pill. After taking the unknown meds for a while, some volunteers experience side effects. Bingo: a clue they’re on the real drug. About 80 percent guess right, and studies show that the worse side effects a patient experiences, the more effective the drug. Patients apparently think, this drug is so strong it’s making me vomit and hate sex, so it must be strong enough to lift my depression. In clinical-trial patients who figure out they’re receiving the drug and not the inert pill, expectations soar.

That matters because belief in the power of a medical treatment can be self-fulfilling (that’s the basis of the placebo effect). The patients who correctly guess that they’re getting the real drug therefore experience a stronger placebo effect than those who get the dummy pill, experience no side effects, and are therefore disappointed. That might account for antidepressants’ slight edge in effectiveness compared with a placebo, an edge that derives not from the drugs’ molecules but from the hopes and expectations that patients in studies feel when they figure out they’re receiving the real drug.

The boy who said the emperor had no clothes didn’t endear himself to his fellow subjects, and Kirsch has fared little better. A nascent collaboration with a scientist at a medical school ended in 2002 when the scientist was warned not to submit a grant proposal with Kirsch if he ever wanted to be funded again. Four years later, another scientist wrote a paper questioning the effectiveness of antidepressants, citing Kirsch’s work. It was published in a prestigious journal. That ordinarily brings accolades. Instead, his department chair dressed him down and warned him not to become too involved with Kirsch.

But the question of whether antidepressants—which in 2008 had sales of $9.6 billion in the U.S., reported the consulting firm IMS Health—have any effect other than through patients’ belief in them was too important to scare researchers off. Proponents of the drugs have found themselves making weaker and weaker claims. Their last stand is that antidepressants are more effective than a placebo in patients suffering the most severe depression.

So concluded the JAMA study in January. In an analysis of six large experiments in which, as usual, depressed patients received either a placebo or an active drug, the true drug effect—that is, in addition to the placebo effect—was “nonexistent to negligible” in patients with mild, moderate, and even severe depression. Only in patients with very severe symptoms (scoring 23 or above on the standard scale) was there a statistically significant drug benefit. Such patients account for about 13 percent of people with depression. “Most people don’t need an active drug,” says Vanderbilt’s Hollon, a coauthor of the study. “For a lot of folks, you’re going to do as well on a sugar pill or on conversations with your physicians as you will on medication. It doesn’t matter what you do; it’s just the fact that you’re doing something.” But people with very severe depression are different, he believes. “My personal view is the placebo effect gets you pretty far, but for those with very severe, more chronic conditions, it’s harder to knock down and placebos are less adequate,” says Hollon. Why that should be remains a mystery, admits coauthor Robert DeRubeis of the University of Pennsylvania.

Like every scientist who has stepped into the treacherous waters of antidepressant research, Hollon, DeRubeis, and their colleagues are keenly aware of the disconnect between evidence and public impression. “Prescribers, policy-makers, and consumers may not be aware that the efficacy of [antidepressants] largely has been established on the basis of studies that have included only those individuals with more severe forms of depression,” something drug ads don’t mention, they write. People with anything less than very severe depression “derive little specific pharmacological benefit from taking medications. Pending findings contrary to those reported here … efforts should be made to clarify to clinicians and prospective patients that … there is little evidence to suggest that [antidepressants] produce specific pharmacological benefit for the majority of patients.”

Right about here, people scowl and ask how anti-depressants—especially those that raise the brain’s levels of serotonin—can possibly have no direct chemical effect on the brain. Surely raising serotonin levels should right the synapses’ “chemical imbalance” and lift depression. Unfortunately, the serotonin-deficit theory of depression is built on a foundation of tissue paper. How that came to be is a story in itself, but the basics are that in the 1950s scientists discovered, serendipitously, that a drug called iproniazid seemed to help some people with depression. Iproniazid increases brain levels of serotonin and norepinephrine. Ergo, low levels of those neurotransmitters must cause depression. More than 50 years on, the presumed effectiveness of antidepressants that act this way remains the chief support for the chemical-imbalance theory of depression. Absent that effectiveness, the theory hasn’t a leg to stand on. Direct evidence doesn’t exist. Lowering people’s serotonin levels does not change their mood. And a new drug, tianeptine, which is sold in France and some other countries (but not the U.S.), turns out to be as effective as Prozac-like antidepressants that keep the synapses well supplied with serotonin. The mechanism of the new drug? It lowers brain levels of serotonin. “If depression can be equally affected by drugs that increase serotonin and by drugs that decrease it,” says Kirsch, “it’s hard to imagine how the benefits can be due to their chemical activity.”

Perhaps antidepressants would be more effective at higher doses? Unfortunately, in 2002 Kirsch and colleagues found that high doses are hardly more effective than low ones, improving patients’ depression-scale rating an average of 9.97 points vs. 9.57 points—a difference that is not statistically significant. Yet many doctors increase doses for patients who do not respond to a lower one, and many patients report improving as a result. There’s a study of that, too. When researchers gave such nonresponders a higher dose, 72 percent got much better, their symptoms dropping by 50 percent or more. The catch? Only half the patients really got a higher dose. The rest, unknowingly, got the original, “ineffective” dose. It is hard to see the 72 percent who got much better on ersatz higher doses as the result of anything but the power of expectation: the doctor upped my dose, so I believe I’ll get better.

Something similar may explain why some patients who aren’t helped by one antidepressant do better on a second, or a third. This is often explained as “matching” patient to drug, and seemed to be confirmed by a 2006 federal study called STAR*D. Patients still suffering from depression after taking one drug were switched to a second; those who were still not better were switched to a third drug, and even a fourth. No placebos were used. At first blush, the results offered a ray of hope: 37 percent of the patients got better on the first drug, 19 percent more on their second, 6 percent more improved on their third try, and 5 percent more on their fourth. (Half of those who recovered relapsed within a year, however.)

So does STAR*D validate the idea that the key to effective treatment of depression is matching the patient to the drug? Maybe. Or maybe people improved in rounds two, three, and four because depression sometimes lifts due to changes in people’s lives, or because levels of depression tend to rise and fall over time. With no one in STAR*D receiving a placebo, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the improvements in rounds two, three, and four were because patients switched to a drug that was more effective for them. Comparable numbers might have improved if they had switched to a placebo. But STAR*D did not test for that, and so cannot rule it out.

It’s tempting to look at the power of the placebo effect to alleviate depression and stick an “only” in front of it—as in, the drugs work only through the placebo effect. But there is nothing “only” about the placebo response. It can be surprisingly enduring, as a 2008 study found: “The widely held belief that the placebo response in depression is short-lived appears to be based largely on intuition and perhaps wishful thinking,” scientists wrote in the Journal of Psychiatric Research. The strength of the placebo response drives drug companies nuts, since it makes showing the superiority of a new drug much harder. There is a strong placebo component in the response to drugs for pain, asthma, irritable-bowel syndrome, skin conditions such as contact dermatitis, and even Parkinson’s disease. But compared with the placebo component of antidepressants, the placebo response accounts for a smaller fraction of the benefit from drugs for those disorders—on the order of 50 percent for analgesics, for instance.

Which returns us to the moral dilemma. In any year, an estimated 13.1 million to 14.2 million American adults suffer from clinical depression. At least 32 million will have the disease at some point in their life. Many of the 57 percent who receive treatment (the rest do not) are helped by medication. For that benefit to continue, they need to believe in their pills. Even Kirsch warns—in boldface type in his book, which is in stores this week—that patients on antidepressants not suddenly stop taking them. That can cause serious withdrawal symptoms, including twitches, tremors, blurred vision, and nausea—as well as depression and anxiety. Yet Kirsch is well aware that his book may have the same effect on patients as the crows did on Dumbo when they told him the “magic feather” wasn’t really giving him the power of flight: the little elephant began crashing to earth. Friends and colleagues who believe Kirsch is right ask why he doesn’t just shut up, since publicizing the finding that the effectiveness of antidepressants is almost entirely due to people’s hopes and expectations will undermine that effectiveness.

It’s all well and good to point out that psychotherapy is more effective than either pills or placebos, with dramatically lower relapse rates. But there’s the little matter of reality. In the U.S., most patients with depression are treated by primary-care doctors, not psychiatrists. The latter are in short supply, especially outside cities and especially for children and adolescents. Some insurance plans discourage such care, and some psychiatrists do not accept insurance. Maybe keeping patients in the dark about the ineffectiveness of antidepressants, which for many are their only hope, is a kindness.

Or maybe not. As shown by the explicit criticism of drug companies by the authors of the recent JAMA paper, more and more scientists believe it is time to abandon the “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy of not digging too deeply into the reasons for the effectiveness of antidepressants. Maybe it is time to pull back the curtain and see the wizard for what he is. As for Kirsch, he insists that it is important to know that much of the benefit of antidepressants is a placebo effect. If placebos can make people better, then depression can be treated without drugs that come with serious side effects, not to mention costs. Wider recognition that antidepressants are a pharmaceutical version of the emperor’s new clothes, he says, might spur patients to try other treatments. “Isn’t it more important to know the truth?” he asks. Based on the impact of his work so far, it’s hard to avoid answering, “Not to many people.”

With Sarah Kliff

He Is the Cow

January 26th, 2010

I found this Indian civil service essay stuffed anonymously in my mailbox today, obviously to reassure me about comprehensive exams… (The student passed!)

“The cow is a successful animal. Also he is quadrupud, And because he is female, he give milk, but will do so when he is got child. He is same like-God, sacred to Hindus and useful to man. But he has got four legs together. Two are forward and two are afterwards.

His whole body can be utilised for use. More so the milk. What can it do? Various ghee, butter, cream, curd, why and the condensed milk and so forth. Also he is useful to cobbler, watermans and mankind generally.

His motion is slow only because he is of asitudinious species. Also he is other motion is much useful to trees, plants as well as making flat cakes in hand and drying in the sun.

Cow is the only animal that extricates his feeding after eating. Then afterwards she chew with his teeth whom are situated in the inside of the mouth. He is incessantly in the meadows in the grass. His only attacking and defending organ is the horns, specially so when he is got child. This is done by knowing his head whereby he causes the weapons to be paralleled to the ground of the earth and instantly proceed with great velocity forwards.

He has got tails also, but not like similar animals. It has hairs on the other end of the other side. This is done to frighten away the flies which Alight on his cohesive body where upon he gives hit with it. The palms of his feet are soft unto the touch. So the grasses head is not crushed. At night time have poses by looking down on the ground and he shouts. His eyes like his relatives, the horse does not do so. This is the cow.

Did You Know?

January 25th, 2010

Counterpoint and modality are musical characteristics prominent in the following Western musical genres: ________ and ________.  (Hints provided below).

PS:  That saucer is a dharmacakra, isn’t it?